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MINES AND UNDERWATER IEDS IN U.S. PORTS
AND WATERWAYS
Context, Threats, Challenges, and Solutions
Scott C. Truver
Abroad spectrum of nontraditional and asymmetric threats challenges U.S.maritime homeland security.1 The smuggling of drugs, arms, and people;
vesselborne improvised explosive devices, like that used by terrorists against the
guided-missile destroyer USS Cole in October 2002; proliferation of chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive weapons of mass destruc-
tion and disruption; piracy and organized crime; overexploitation of marine re-
sources and the destruction of marine habitats; environmental attacks and trade
disruption; political and religious extremism; mass migration flows; global
health threats (e.g., the spread of infectious diseases like SARS and avian flu)—
all these and more pose far-reaching dangers for American security interests at
home and abroad. Under the cloak of legal activity, groups that would do us
harm can enter the U.S. homeland anywhere along more than ninety-five thou-
sand miles of coastlines and through some 360 ports from Maine to Guam.
“The challenge is enduring,” Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S.
Coast Guard, wrote in his foreword to the Coast Guard’s 2007 maritime security
strategy.2 “The threats of the Cold War are gone, and we again find ourselves op-
erating in an environment where piracy, illegal migra-
tion, drug smuggling, terrorism, arms proliferation
and environmental crimes are carried out by anony-
mous, loosely affiliated perpetrators.”
Naval mines and underwater improvised explosive
devices (UWIEDs, or minelike “booby traps”) are among
these threats to U.S. maritime interests.3 A true
“sleeper threat,”mines and UWIEDs can with great ef-
fect attack the good order of American ports and
Dr. Truver is executive adviser, national security
programs, Gryphon Technologies LC. He was the prin-
cipal author of the U.S. Navy’s 1992 Mine Warfare
Plan and supported the development of subsequent
plans. He has written extensively on mines and mine
countermeasures, coauthoring the second edition of the
U.S. Naval Institute’s Weapons That Wait: Mine
Warfare in the U.S. Navy. Dr. Truver is a member of
the editorial board of this journal.
Naval War College Review, Winter 2008, Vol. 61, No. 1
1
Truver: Mines and Underwater IEDs in U.S. Ports and Waterways
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008
waterways. They are the quintessential asymmetric naval weapons, used for
more than two centuries by weak naval powers against the strong, regardless of
whether they were “unworthy of a chivalrous nation,” as Rear Admiral David G.
Farragut, of “Damn the torpedoes!” fame, declared.4 If left unaddressed, they
could constitute an Achilles’ heel for U.S. homeland security.
Until very recently, naval mines and UWIEDs, if included in domestic mari-
time threat assessments at all, have usually been relegated to the status of a
“lesser included” problem.5 If we can deal, it is argued, with what planners be-
lieve are the more likely maritime threats, especially vesselborne devices, we can
certainly handle mines and underwater IEDs. But the history of naval and ter-
rorist mining since 1945 challenges this assumption, and the stakes are high if it
turns out to be wrong. Indeed, the assessments and planning that have focused
on the M/UWIED threat underscore critical weaknesses in how federal, re-
gional, state, and local actors charged with ensuring America’s maritime secu-
rity, as well as private entities whose assets are at risk, must respond to weapons
that can easily be deployed in U.S. ports and waterways.
THE NATURE OF THE M/UWIED THREAT
In the American experience, the first use of UWIEDs came in September 1776,
when the patriot (or, in English eyes, terrorist) David Bushnell attempted to fix a
limpet mine on Lord Howe’s flagship HMS Eagle in the Hudson River.6
Bushnell’s attack was frustrated by bad luck and the “passive protection” of the
ship’s iron fittings. Fifteen months later, Bushnell used floating kegs of gun-
powder fitted with contact-firing mechanisms against the British fleet above
Philadelphia; four British sailors died trying to retrieve the kegs from the Dela-
ware River—an early example of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) against an
unknown threat—but the fleet was unscathed.7
More than two centuries on, terrorists can use or threaten to use mines and
UWIEDs for a variety of political, economic, or military ends, often with psy-
chological effects foremost in mind. While small devices might have no more
than nuisance value, as a way to exacerbate anxieties (Boston’s reaction to “guer-
rilla marketing” in early 2007 comes to mind), larger mines can be placed sur-
reptitiously in channels and harbors to achieve spectacular effects—against, for
example, the Staten Island Ferry, crammed with 2,500 commuters during an
evening rush hour, or a cruise ship with four thousand vacationers and crew on
board leaving Miami or Seattle.8 The tragedy of hundreds of bodies floating in a
port would intensify the psychological message about the true security of Amer-
ica’s home waters.
Mines can directly attack the nation’s waterborne trade. More than 90 percent
of American exports and imports by volume transits U.S. ports, and the efficient
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and safe movement of our foreign, coastal, and inland-waters trades is critical
for America’s globalized, just-in-time, and just-enough economy. The economic
consequences of just a few mines in our ports could be catastrophic, as the
two-week West Coast labor slowdown in the fall of 2002 implies—a $1.95 billion
impact per day. According to a University of California at Berkeley analysis, the
direct and indirect economic impacts of a twenty-day longshoremen’s work ac-
tion would cost the U.S. economy more than $50 billion (in 2002 dollars).9 Even
if no ships were sunk or damaged and no channels were blocked, explosions in a
few key ports on East, Gulf, and West coasts and in the Saint Lawrence Seaway—
clearly not an impossible feat, as September 11th tragically proved—would have
a chilling effect on commercial shipping in terms of increased insurance costs
and vessel lay days. The economic tremors would reverberate throughout the
nation and to trading partners overseas.
There could be serious military impacts, as well. Mines in critical waterways
could slow the movement of military cargoes in crisis and conflict. During
World War II, the port of Charleston, South Carolina, was closed for sixteen days
by mines from German submarines. In all, U-boats managed to lay 327 mines
from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to the Mississippi Delta, closing several ports for a to-
tal of forty days and sinking or damaging eleven ships. Today, while mines might
not be “showstoppers,” they would certainly be “speed bumps”; just a few weap-
ons in the approaches to the port of Savannah, Georgia; the Houston Ship Chan-
nel; and one or two other waterways could hamper the military sealift that
undergirds war plans.10
Mines and underwater IEDs are easy to acquire or build, and they are cheap,
ranging from a few tens of dollars to thirty thousand dollars for the most ad-
vanced, multiple-influence weapons.11 But their low cost belies their potential
for harm. They can be deployed by submarines, surface warships, small craft,
commercial vessels, dhows, fishing vessels, pleasure boats, fixed-wing aircraft,
and helicopters. They are designed for operations from the surf zone (less than
ten-foot water depth) to deep water (greater than two hundred feet). Their pay-
loads can range from a few pounds to several tons of high explosive, and they can
have a variety of firing mechanisms: remote control and command; contact; and
magnetic, acoustic, seismic, pressure, or combinations of some or all such “in-
fluence” signatures of ships.
Mines can be buoyant and suspended in the water column, close tethered to
the bottom, resting on the bottom, or even buried under sediments to confound
minehunting and sweeping. Some mines are mobile, capable of being launched
from submarines thousands of yards from intended minefields, while others
have torpedo or rocket-propelled warheads that dramatically expand potential
damage zones against submarine and surface targets. Limpet mines are designed
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to be placed directly on targets by combat swimmers or, perhaps even today, un-
manned undersea vehicles (UUVs). Old mines can be refitted with modern,
highly sophisticated components, and any mine can be equipped with counter-
countermeasure features to frustrate EOD, sweeping, and hunting. They can be
fabricated from fiberglass and plastic, making them extremely difficult to detect,
identify, or counter—once in the water.
More than that, mines are a broad-spectrum, global threat. According to
Navy data, more than a quarter-million naval mines of more than three hundred
types are in the inventories of more than fifty navies, not counting American
weapons. More than thirty countries produce, and more than twenty countries
export, mines. Even highly sophisticated weapons are available on the black
market, usually on a cash-and-carry basis. Worse, these Navy figures are for
mines proper; they do not include UWIEDs, which can be fabricated easily and
cheaply, as an Iraqi “bicycle”-type, floating, anti-small-boat mine encountered
during Operation DESERT SHIELD proved. As then–Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) Admiral C. A. H. Trost, USN, remarked in July 1989, at the height of the
Persian Gulf “Tanker War” mine strikes:
Very little sophistication is required to manufacture and deploy mines. Any nation
with either money to buy mines on the open market, or the capability to forge metal
and make explosives, can become an active participant in mine warfare. Minefields
can be seeded by anything that flies or floats. And again, crude but effective mines are
cheap, easy to stockpile, and easily concealed in holds of ships and fishing boats.12
THE POST–WORLD WAR II MINE EXPERIENCE
Winston Churchill once remarked, “The farther backward you look the farther
forward you can see.” The U.S. Navy’s post–World War II mines and mine
countermeasures experience underscores the cost-effectiveness of these weap-
ons that wait and the need to counter them.13
At the outset of the Korean War, in September–October 1950, some three
thousand Soviet and Chinese mines kept a 250-ship amphibious task force at
bay off the coast of Wonsan for a week. Three minesweepers were lost and more
than a hundred men killed during the initial minesweeping operations through
early November. Overall, though the U.S. mine force accounted for just 2 per-
cent of the UN naval forces during the three-year “police action,” it suffered 20
percent of the casualties.
Two U.S. Navy warships suffered mine strikes during the Vietnam War, while
the Vietcong and North Vietnamese army used a bewildering variety of
UWIEDs and mines—from antipersonnel floating-basket booby traps with a
handful of explosive to a two-thousand-pound command-detonated weapon—
in the rivers and deltas. (Another one or two Navy ships might have been victims
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of “friendly fire” from USN converted-bomb Mark-62/63/64 Destructor
mines—themselves essentially very sophisticated UWIEDs.) As the Navy con-
tinues to stand up its new Naval Expeditionary Combat Command and squad-
rons, the experiences of task forces 116 and 117 in Vietnam can provide
important lessons for future “riverine” and “brown water” MCM operations.14
During the Tanker War, the guided-missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts al-
most sank, with potentially great loss of life, after striking a Soviet-designed
World War I–era contact mine on 14 April 1987.15 Only heroic efforts kept the
ship afloat. Repairs cost about $96 million, from a $1,500 weapon. On 18 Febru-
ary 1991, in the same waters, the helicopter assault ship USS Tripoli encountered
an Iraqi contact mine, which blew a hole twenty-three feet by twenty-five in its
starboard side. Four hours later, the Aegis guided-missile cruiser Princeton was
almost broken in half by an Italian-made Manta bottom mine in approximately
sixty-five feet of water. Princeton had to be taken out of the war, and the total cost
to repair came to more than $110 million—all from a single mine costing about
fifteen thousand dollars. The presence of some 1,300 Iraqi mines laid by barges
and tugs in the northern Persian Gulf utterly frustrated plans for a Marine am-
phibious task force to open up a second front east of Kuwait City. Finally, the
posthostilities mine clearance took eight navies’ mine countermeasures (MCM)
forces nearly two years to confirm that ten mine-danger areas had been made
safe for naval and maritime traffic. The U.S. Navy still homeports several MCM
vessels in Bahrain, just in case a quick response is needed.
Since the end of World War II, then, mines have damaged or sunk four times
more U.S. Navy ships than have all other means of attack: mines, fifteen ships;
missiles, one; torpedoes/aircraft, two; small-boat terrorist attack, one (and this
last, the attack on Cole, can be seen as a “terrorist in the loop” mobile-mine
strike).
In addition to the U.S. Navy’s experiences with mines since September 1945,
mines have been used or threatened in a wide variety of scenarios that are har-
bingers of terrorist dangers yet to come. In October 1946, during a “freedom of
navigation” operation, two Royal Navy warships were severely damaged by Soviet-
made mines laid by Albania in the Corfu Channel. In 1974–75, the U.S. Navy as-
sisted in clearing the Suez Canal and its approaches of mines and unexploded
ordnance left from the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
The “patriotic scuba diver” mine crisis of January 1980 showed that a terror-
ist threat of mines—in this case “mining” the Sacramento River during the So-
viet grain embargo announced by President Jimmy Carter—could have
dramatic effects on maritime trade. An unknown person identifying himself as
the “patriotic scuba diver” claimed by telephone to have placed a mine in the water-
way; all shipping movement ceased almost immediately. Once on scene, the
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Navy minesweeper USS Gallant required four days of intensive minehunting to
determine the channel was safe. No mines were discovered, but the cost in mer-
chant vessel lay days caused by the hoax was estimated in the hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars.
Since the 1970s, the Tamil Tigers have been particularly vicious in mine at-
tacks against Sri Lankan government ships, commercial vessels, and private
boats. In 1982, the Argentine military used mines during the Falklands War. Re-
ports have the Nicaraguan Contras using limpet mines to damage two ships in
Corinto Harbor in 1984, in a direct challenge to the Sandinistas.
But it was the “Mines of August” crisis in the summer of 1984 that showed
most vividly how easily mines can be used as weapons of maritime terror.16
From 19 July to 13 September as many as twenty-three vessels reported damage
from underwater explosions in the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez, a rash of attacks
that generated a massive multinational mine countermeasures response. Egypt,
France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and the United
States helped clear the waterway. Only one new mine was recovered and ren-
dered safe, by Royal Navy divers—a 1,700-pound, multiple-influence Soviet
bottom mine completely unknown in the West. (The British and French MCM
forces also detected, identified, and destroyed a two-thousand-pound bomb, a
practice torpedo, and numerous old mines, some dating to World War II.) Later
it was proved that Libyan naval personnel aboard the commercial ferry Ghat had
rolled off the mines as the vessel meandered throughout the waterway, com-
pletely unchallenged, for more than two weeks. This experience prompted Ad-
miral Trost to comment that
five years ago mine warfare entered the age of indiscriminate terrorism and inter-
national blackmail. . . . No country claimed responsibility for this act, but that did
not change the reality that mines were there impeding the flow of commerce in this
major waterway. . . . The bottom line is simple. Mine warfare may not be considered
glamorous, some even call it ugly. But it works well. For the most part, a mine doesn’t
care who or what you are, and usually gives little warning of its presence.17
Finally (although more incidents might well remain unreported), on 21 April
2004 a tugboat operator on Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, spotted a suspicious
floating bag and called the Coast Guard.18 The Coast Guard contacted the Jeffer-
son Parish bomb squad, which fished the bag out of the water. It proved to be a
UWIED, a couple of pounds of explosive in plastic pipes with a timer, wrapped
in trash bags to keep it afloat. One possible target was Senator John Kerry, a pres-
idential hopeful who had been scheduled for a campaign trip on the lake. The
bomb squad used a water cannon to neutralize the device.
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In addition to showing how easily a UWIED can be built, this incident high-
lights the challenges of deciding who is in charge of response to a mine crisis in
American ports and waterways: the Coast Guard or the Navy? What are the roles
and responsibilities of local police bomb squads or fire departments? In some
jurisdictions, even natural-resources police could be involved. Most fundamen-
tally, is an M/UWIED incident a homeland security or a homeland-defense “prob-
lem,” and who makes the call, one way or the other, when the first weapon fires?
FRAMEWORK AND RESPONSIBILITIES
At the federal level, domestic mine/UWIED responsibilities seem to be clear.
Under the 2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Coast Guard, in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency for mari-
time homeland security (MHLS).19 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the
Department of Justice, is the lead agency for terrorism/counterterrorism; Jus-
tice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives also figures promi-
nently in investigations involving explosives. The Navy, in the Department of
Defense, is the lead for mine countermeasures expertise and operations. Below
this strategic context, however, relationships remain murky, and the frame-
works—let alone the formal requirements—for responding to a mine or
UWIED threat at the operational and tactical levels need work.
Under the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, the National Re-
sponse Plan, the National Incident Management System and the National Inci-
dent Command System, and the Maritime Operational Threat Response
(MOTR) Plan provide the going-in architecture for MHLS operations. But re-
gional, state, local, and commercial partners must also be closely integrated and
informed. Indeed, a multiagency, multiple-governmental command, control,
communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance architecture
and response system is needed for each U.S. port—or at least the seventeen “tier
one” facilities having significant military or economic importance—within the
overall maritime homeland security and maritime domain awareness (MDA)
framework. Mines and UWIEDs collectively represent just one set of the many
threats to the nation’s maritime homeland security, but they are particularly
treacherous, insidious, and deadly—and at this writing in mid-2007 were not
yet included in the Defense Department’s MDA concept of operations. Never-
theless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Homeland Defense publication in numerous
places does address the threat from mines in U.S. ports and waterways and out-
lines the supported and supporting roles in domestic countermining and mine
countermeasures operations.20
The U.S. Coast Guard’s sector commanders, in their roles as “Captains of the
Port” (COTPs) and local Federal Maritime Security Coordinators, will be
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crucial to mine/UWIED defense. Among other vital security and safety func-
tions, COTPs:
• Establish the port maritime security plans for their respective areas of
responsibility
• Conduct risk-based area security assessments
• Develop area maritime transportation plans
• Have command-control-communications responsibilities and authorities
for MHLS incidents
• Can close ports in the event of emergency
• Provide a vital “bridging function” among the Defense and Navy departments
and regional, state, local, and commercial partners, as a result of the Coast
Guard’s inherent military, civilian, maritime, law enforcement, and human-
itarian character and authorities.
But a Captain of the Port has no capability—or even desire—actually to con-
duct MCM operations. Vice Admiral James D. Hull, USCG (Retired), who
served as Atlantic Area Commander, understood well the need to deal with
mines and UWIEDs in American waters, “but that’s primarily the Navy’s re-
sponsibility,” as he later explained.21 “The Navy has the expertise and equipment
to do the job. The real question is whether the Navy’s MCM forces can respond
in the appropriate time to neutralize a no-notice threat.” Of interest in this re-
gard is the fact that the Coast Guard’s 2007 Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security,
and Stewardship in only two places mentions “water-borne IEDs,” and even
there it limits the concept to a small-boat/bomb threat like the one that attacked
the USS Cole and nowhere mentions mines or underwater IEDs.22 Likewise, the
Coast Guard’s Underwater Terrorism Protection Plan of mid-2007 does not ad-
dress mine/UWIED threats or defense requirements.
Since 2003, the Navy and Coast Guard have, however, come together at the
“grassroots” levels to address the mine and UWIED threat. The three LEAD
SHIELD exercises on the West Coast have uncovered surprising capabilities and
strengths but also many more areas that need close attention, especially command-
and-control relationships involving nonmilitary participants.23 Other war
games conducted by the Office of Naval Research and by the mine warfare pro-
gram at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School during 2006–2007 have identified
technological, system, and platform issues that also need focused attention and
sustained funding.24
More, a 2005 memorandum of agreement between the Department of De-
fense and the Department of Homeland Security for the inclusion of the Coast
T R U V E R 1 1 3
8
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 1, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss1/8
Guard in support of Maritime Homeland Defense (MHLD) established for
MHLD operations a Defense Department joint command and control structure
that includes Coast Guard forces and identified that service’s MHLD roles, mis-
sions, and functions.25 It recognizes that the Coast Guard “is at all times a mili-
tary service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States,” is charged
with maintaining a state of readiness “to function as a specialized service in the
Navy in time of war,” and is “authorized to work closely and cooperatively with
the Navy during peacetime.” The memorandum of agreement also underscores
the Coast Guard’s role “in support of the National Security Strategy while main-
taining its identity as an armed force.” Recognizing also that maritime homeland
defense missions “required flexibility, time-critical response, and immediate ac-
cess to a broad spectrum of capabilities and associated forces to ensure mission
success,” it “establishes a standing DoD [Department of Defense]/DHS working
relationship and operational C2 [command and control] construct for conduct-
ing MHLD missions under the authority and command of DoD.”
The next year, the secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security signed a
memorandum of agreement for Defense support to the Coast Guard for mari-
time homeland security.26 That memorandum identified and documented ap-
propriate MHLS capabilities, roles, missions, and functions for the Defense
Department and arrangements to facilitate the rapid transfer of tactical control
of forces to the Coast Guard in support of MHLS operations generally. The
memorandum recognized the constraints on Defense Department support to
law enforcement operations, a consequence of the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act,
which does not affect the Coast Guard.27 It also laid down that the Coast Guard
would have the predominant MHLS role and be the lead federal agency for exer-
cising law enforcement authorities on waters subject to American jurisdiction
(from inland waters to the extent of the exclusive economic zone) and on, under,
and over the high seas.28 In addition, the memorandum of agreement under-
scored the Coast Guard’s role in the armed deterrence of as well as response to acts
of terrorism in the maritime environment. Although it granted the Coast Guard
tactical control over Defense Department forces in maritime homeland defense
operations, it noted that this would not confer “type command” authority;29 all
DoD forces operating under Coast Guard tactical control would remain under
DoD command.
The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan and its outline of supported/
supporting relationships are particularly important for defending against mines
and UWIEDs. The plan includes mines in its catalog of threats to U.S. maritime
security and identifying Defense as “the lead MOTR agency for tactical response
and resolution of nation-state threats within the maritime domain,” as well as
for “maritime terrorist threats that occur in the forward maritime areas of
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responsibility.” Further, while the Coast Guard has the lead in responding to
maritime terrorist threats in U.S. waters, clearly the Defense Department has a
major role as a supporting agency.
For domestic MCM operations, then, the Navy’s airborne, surface, and un-
derwater MCM forces and EOD mine countermeasures assets, particularly the
shallow-water Naval Special Clearance Team (NSCT) 1, with its marine mam-
mals and UUV MCM systems, will be “chopped” (operationally turned over) to
USCG sector commanders/Captains of the Port, as they have overall command
and control responsibilities for maritime homeland security.
These dedicated MCM forces are being concentrated in Norfolk, Virginia,
and San Diego and Coronado, California; EOD MCM mobile unit detachments
are also based at Charleston, South Carolina, and Whidbey Island, Washington.
In October 2006, the Navy disestablished the Commander, Mine Warfare Com-
mand, in Corpus Christi, Texas, and began moving staff to the revamped Naval
Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command in San Diego. All air, surface, and
underwater MCM and explosive-ordnance-demolition assets will be operating
out of southern Texas in the next few years. That needs to be borne in mind, be-
cause although the airborne MCM helicopter squadrons, EOD MCM mobile
units, and NSCT 1 can be airlifted anywhere in the world within seventy-two
hours or so, assuming overtaxed American strategic airlift assets are available,
and while the helos can self-deploy within the United States, the surface vessels
have top speeds of only ten or twelve knots, making a quick response in most sce-
narios problematic.
Under the still-operationalizing “National Fleet” policy, both the Navy and
Coast Guard are looking to innovative solutions to meet current and future re-
quirements across the spectrum of both services’ roles, missions, and tasks.
(First promulgated by Commandant Admiral James M. Loy and Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Jay Johnson in September 1998, the National Fleet policy
has since been formally expanded and embraced by subsequent commandants
and CNOs, in 2002 and 2006.)30 For example, the Navy is addressing domestic
MCM requirements and capabilities, and Navy and Coast Guard planners are
developing a joint domestic MCM concept of operations within the MOTR
planning process. But perceptions of the threat and requirements to deal with it
are uneven: in mid-2007, for example, the Department of Defense concept of
operations for maritime domain awareness did not even mention mines, much
less UWIEDs, and there were no formal operational DoD requirements for do-
mestic mine countermeasures operations.
One of the Coast Guard’s contributions to the National Fleet will be a new
Deployable Operations Group (DOG), championed by Admiral Allen. The con-
cept calls for a close integration of the Coast Guard’s port security units, the
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National Strike Force, maritime safety and security teams, the Maritime Secu-
rity Response Team, and the tactical law enforcement teams into adaptable force
packages that can be surged domestically and internationally to meet emergency
requirements.31
Moreover, these forces will be available not only to Coast Guard operational
commanders but also to other federal agency operational commanders for mis-
sions throughout the United States and overseas high-interest areas. If the new
DOG can be taught some old (and new) MCM tricks, even if no more than
mine-awareness training, the group’s adaptable force packages could be the
Coast Guard’s “surge responders”—complementing the first-responder sector
and COTP personnel already on scene—to an M/UWIED incident well in ad-
vance of Navy mine countermeasures forces that might require several days if
not longer to respond, unless the threat presents itself in or near Charleston,
Norfolk, San Diego, or Whidbey Island.
“But, I’m not sure we’ve done all our homework concerning who could or
should hunt for real weapons,” says Captain Thomas B. Davilli, USN (Retired),
who has extensive air MCM operational and command experience.32 “One thing
I do know, AMCM, SMCM, and UMCM [airborne, surface, and underwater
MCM] assets are designed and prepared for and take specific procedural mea-
sures to allow them to operate safely in the presence of the threat. Whether oth-
ers will have the capability is doubtful,” he continues. “Some players in a recent
war game pointed to a local law enforcement organization that has an EOD-like
response dive team. It might be able to handle an underwater IED, but they are
not diving in low-influence gear. And, the presence of an antitamper counter-
measures device on the mine or UWIED certainly complicates consideration of
manned operations.” Further, “Others have suggested hunting for actual mines
from small craft towing commercial side-scan sonars. The helmsman and other
crew would indeed be patriots! The thought of sending crewed assets into a
mined threat area without signature silencing or some sort of ‘safe track’ proce-
dures is foolish.”
In July 2007, the Coast Guard announced that it had been training as many as
six hundred police and rescue scuba-team divers to help protect the nation’s
ports, harbors, and waterways against terrorists.33 “For the first time in the in-
dustry, we have a malicious threat to manage,” Steven Orusa of the International
Association of Dive Rescue Specialists has noted. “Any place that has water in its
jurisdiction may have a risk—recreational, commercial, shipping or industrial.”
Some teams have received new equipment, such as underwater robots and sonar
systems. In Jacksonville, Florida, the sixteen-member dive team responsible for
underwater security is part of the sheriff department’s homeland security divi-
sion. In the past two years, the team received $596,000 from the Department of
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Homeland Security to buy equipment, including boats, a sonar system, and an
underwater remotely operated vehicle. Kenneth McDaniel, chief of underwater
port security for the Coast Guard, comments that his unit has worked with the
Department of Homeland Security intelligence division to develop a course that
teaches divers how to search for and identify “underwater hazardous devices” or
explosives that might have been placed on ship hulls, bridges, or piers. “We do
underwater hull searches, and we sweep ports,” Orusa, leader of a dive team that
covers Chicago and other Midwest towns, explains. “There’s a whole layer of
skill sets we’ve developed.”
There are concerns, however, should anything but the simplest limpets or
UWIEDs be encountered. Underscoring the importance of appropriate equip-
ment, preparation, and training, Captain Davilli concludes, “clearly, this is not a
job for well-intentioned amateurs.”
THE M/UWIED DEFENSE CHALLENGE
The United States confronts the daunting task of protecting, as noted, some
ninety-five thousand miles of coastlines, as well as thousands of miles of inland
and Great Lakes waterways, 361 ports, and a territorial sea/exclusive economic
zone that comprises more than 3.4 million square miles of ocean space and at
any time is cluttered with thousands of warships, commercial vessels and fishing
boats, tugs and ferries—not to ignore millions of private pleasure craft. Sorting
the legal from the illegal in such a complex maritime domain is a Herculean task
that challenges federal, regional, state, and local agencies, as well as commercial
entities and other nongovernmental organizations, to work hand in glove and
also to collaborate with allies and friends to safeguard maritime security at
home and abroad.
Maritime domain awareness—what the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime
Security describes as the “effective understanding of anything associated with
the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or envi-
ronment of the United States, and identifying threats as early and as distant from
our shores as possible”—will thus be absolutely necessary for success against a
broad spectrum of maritime threats, including mines and underwater IEDs.34
Exacerbating the M/UWIED challenge for federal, state, and local actors is
the fact that no two ports are alike. Each differs in geography, channel layout,
bathymetry, wind, tide, current, bottom sediment, turbidity, climate, and criti-
cal infrastructure—piers and wharves, moorings, navigation markers, cables,
pipelines, and more, with most bottom infrastructure uncharted or its location
long forgotten. That fact will make the already complex problem of detecting,
identifying, and defeating M/UWIEDs even more daunting. Questions begging
answers include:
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• What is already on the bottom?
• How do we know when something new is there?
• What is the local oceanographic and environmental situation?
• What port or waterway infrastructure needs to be protected from M/UWIEDs,
as well as from the Navy’s countermine operations?
• In a crisis, could we quickly and effectively tell the difference between a re-
frigerator or a fifty-five-gallon drum—what in the MCM trade is called a
“nonmine/minelike bottom object” (or “NOMBO”)—and the real thing?
The best MCM is to interdict the minelayers before the weapons can be put in
the water. If that fails, the Coast Guard, Navy, FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, and other federal and nonfederal first responders will
need to understand what the Naval Oceanography Program describes as the “in-
telligence preparation of the environment.”35
First, strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence about the mine/UWIED
threat is absolutely essential: What terrorist groups are active? What weapons
might they have? Are there any indications and warning that they are planning
single or multiple strikes in U.S. waters? What tactics might they employ? In ad-
dition to good strategic and operational intelligence, existing and future MDA
vessel surveillance, identification, and tracking systems and organizations, such
as the Coast Guard/Navy Joint Harbor Operations Centers, need to be “attuned”
at the tactical level to the potential need to detect, control, and engage minelay-
ers before they start their tasks.
Second, and of equal but different importance, there must be environmental
awareness of potential mining areas and data of sufficient quality and currency
to support MCM operations. At least for each of the seventeen tier-one ports
these data must be available and up to date:
• Port geography and infrastructure from the high-water mark seaward
• Climatic, environmental, and oceanographic factors and their daily/
monthly/yearly variations
• Detailed sonar bottom maps and surveys, at high precision and accuracy, to
determine clutter and known NOMBO contacts for change detection and
possible channel conditioning before a crisis erupts.
It has been years since the U.S. Navy, developing port-breakout concepts in
the Cold War, conducted routine bottom surveys and mapped “Q-routes” to en-
sure the safe egress of warships and auxiliary and sealift vessels in support of na-
tional strategies and war plans. While there might well be databases for selected
ports, waterways, or estuaries that could satisfy some (but certainly not all) port
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geography and environmental data needs, the reality, as former defense secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld acknowledged, is that “we don’t know what we don’t know.”
Who has what data and information today? The Oceanographer and Naviga-
tor of the Navy? The Meteorology and Oceanography Command? The Coast
Guard? National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)? The
Corps of Engineers? State or local agencies, or regional authorities? Local pilots
and the maritime transportation industry? Sea Grant colleges and marine environ-
mental groups? Whoever has these data, are they good enough to support MCM
operations? Where are the gaps in our knowledge? Who should have the responsi-
bility to fill them?
Some have suggested that the Navy revisit its port-breakout model for key
commercial and military ports to identify critical routes and other areas needing
attention and to conduct channel-conditioning operations that would in essence
wipe clean selected areas to facilitate subsequent change detection. (By 2006, the
Royal Navy had already embarked on such an effort in several British ports.)
Others have proposed resurrecting the ill-fated COOP—Craft of Opportunity—
program of the mid-1990s and having Navy Reserve units conduct periodic sur-
veying and sonar mapping of bottoms. Still others have recommended that the
maritime transportation industry and port authorities take the lead for local
areas. Or the survey and mapping responsibilities could be outsourced to com-
mercial contractors. In short, in mid-2007 there was no coherent plan, staffing,
or program—except perhaps for references to the USCG’s sector/COTP respon-
sibilities for port maritime security plans, area security assessments, and area
maritime transportation plans, in addition to the efforts of the Maritime Secu-
rity Policy Coordination Committee—to address this threat and port geography
and environmental data requirements. Even then, Captain Davilli’s concerns
loom large.
Collecting such MCM data for even a handful of ports and keeping it up to
date will not be inexpensive. In May 2007, for example, NOAA estimated that it
could conduct a survey program that would support draft Navy–Coast Guard
operational concepts—twenty ports per year and relooking every three years—
at a cost of approximately $14 million per year. This figure is well below an “edu-
cated guess” that Los Angeles/Long Beach alone would require about $10 mil-
lion annually, raised during a December 2006 technology war game.36 In any
case, compared to the $60 billion economic impact if major ports were closed
for a couple of weeks or more, several million dollars each year seems to be an in-
surance premium that the nation could and should afford.
Still, the operational challenge should not be underestimated. An April–May
2007 San Diego mine warfare harbor survey conducted by Third Fleet and sup-
ported by the Naval Oceanography Operations Command, the Naval
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Oceanographic Office, EOD Group 1, U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Diego, and
NOAA provided a real-world look at the complexity of the problem. According
to Captain James Berdeguez, Director, Oceanography Operations for Mine War-
fare at the Naval Oceanography Operations Command, the survey of eleven
nautical miles of channel and secondary areas required nearly six hundred
man-hours to complete—350 hours for the actual survey and about 230 hours
for analysis of the data collected on the more than six hundred minelike and
nonminelike contacts detected.37 Clutter, bottom roughness, sediment burial, in
situ optics, currents, bathymetry, sound-velocity profiles, and infrastructure
significantly complicated the survey effort.
However any focused domestic mine survey program is undertaken, a con-
sensus is growing that there must be a central database of American port infra-
structure and environmental survey data that can “set data standards, conduct
critical analysis to produce tactical decision aid products, and hold this informa-
tion centrally,” according to Commander Robert Witzleb, Deputy Director,
Oceanography Operations for Mine Warfare.38 “Such a centralized data reposi-
tory exists in practice at the Naval Oceanographic Office, which has the largest
oceanographic holdings in the world, but is nonetheless very weak in US waters.
For that reason,” he continued, “Navy METOC [the Meteorology and Oceanog-
raphy Command] has prepared a draft technical instruction, Mine Warfare Sur-
vey in Support of Maritime Homeland Defense, that explicitly details how we
would collect environmental data to support domestic MCM operations.”
“We need that information now, not when the act takes place,” Tony Fuller,
who supports concept development and experimentation for Navy mine war-
fare sea trial initiatives, noted in a March 2007 e-mail exchange. “There is a sig-
nificant amount of gap analysis that will need to be conducted, probably
followed by substantial programmatic issue work. In simplest deck-plate terms,
the direction as to what has to be brought to bear in a port to begin MCM in how
much time, culminating with what has to be accomplished, in how much time,
to make the call that all, or part, of a port is ‘open’ is needed.”
Finally, there are operational and tactical issues that need to be addressed.
The Coast Guard and Navy in the spring of 2007 were developing a domestic
MCM concept of operations within the MOTR framework. These concepts and
associated response plans, which will involve relevant state and local actors,
must be specific to and in place for selected ports and waterways well in advance
of the first “flaming datum.” The two services are building upon recent war
games and exercises—for example, LEAD SHIELD III in 2005, which brought to-
gether a broad spectrum of federal, state, and local agencies and organizations to
deal with terrorist mines in the port of Los Angeles/Long Beach—and upon the
Navy’s real-world experiences of clearing the port of Umm Qasr, Iraq, in 2003.
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Coast Guard, Navy, and other participants must equip for, train to, and exercise
the plans; analyze and share the results of the exercises and war games; refine
concepts of operations and “TTPs” (tactics, techniques, and procedures); incor-
porate new technologies and systems—and then plan and train and exercise
again, and then again.
“The Umm Qasr port MCM ops show what we might confront in a domestic
mining incident,” said Captain Terry Miller, who has more than twenty years’ ex-
perience as a surface mine warfare officer and commander, including in DESERT
STORM mine-clearance operations.39 An international MCM force comprising
Royal Australian Navy and Royal Navy explosive-ordnance-demolition and
mine countermeasures specialists and American NSCT 1 divers, aided by ma-
rine mammals and UUVs, cleared some nine hundred square miles to enable the
landing ship RFA Galahad to deliver much-needed humanitarian-relief supplies
at the outset of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
“The Australians worked in some very confined areas, alongside piers, and
among numerous obstacles and clutter,” Miller noted, “and were aided by their
extensive HLS planning and training for the 2000 Sydney Olympics.” The lack of
prior knowledge of the port and its approaches, however, contributed to the fact
that nine days of intensive underwater MCM operations were needed to clear
the channel for Galahad and follow-on shipping. Closing Los Angeles/Long
Beach for nine days could cost the American economy as much as $18 billion.
These domestic plans and concepts of operations should also identify where
the Navy can sweep and where it must hunt. Constrained airspace and water
space and extensive port infrastructures will certainly affect the ability to use
traditional airborne and surface sweeping gear or to neutralize mines/UWIEDs
by hunting or sweeping. While in some cases it will be appropriate to “blow in
place” weapons that are discovered, in others critical port assets could be dam-
aged severely by a detonation. When “BIP” is not feasible, the Navy would have
to raise and neutralize or render safe the mines, a process that would also sup-
port intelligence exploitation of the weapons and law-enforcement evidentiary
needs. It would also, however, increase the danger and the duration of the counter-
mine process.
There are, as well, logistical concerns that arise unless the mine crisis occurs
near Navy MCM bases or home ports. Transit times will affect responses and con-
tribute to economic hardships until ports and waterways are declared safe. If mine
countermeasures helicopters had to self-deploy across the country, they might re-
quire maintenance before getting gear in the water, unavoidably extending the du-
ration of the crisis. The physical security of MCM assets—helicopters at nearby
commercial airports and vessels in commercial berths—must also be assured,
which could put additional strains on local capabilities. Finally, the plans must
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consider “hotel” sustainment for crews—including the marine mammals, if they
deploy—and support people and maintenance support for platforms and systems
if the crisis goes on for long. In short, the Coast Guard and the Navy must start
planning notional “time-phased force deployment data” for domestic MCM
operations.
“Until we have an approved HLS/MCM CONOPS [concept of operations] it’s
hard to say what level of capability is missing,” Captain Miller offered. “Most cer-
tainly confined waters inside an inner harbor pose challenges for the current force
construct, although we did adapt and overcome the Umm Qasr challenge with
some innovations in systems and TTPs. Plus we have quite extensive lessons
learned from ‘Down Under’ during the Sydney Olympics,” he continued. “Sydney
had an extensive harbor defense plan that accounted for mines and floating IEDs
and is a blueprint for any mine/UWIED scenario and domestic MCM planning.”
In the spring of 2007, Rear Admiral John J. Waickwicz, Commander, Naval
Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command, directed his staff to brief him on
the operational environment and all salient issues and requirements relating to
the Navy’s support to Northern Command, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, and the Coast Guard in response to a mining or IED attack in U.S. ports or
waterways.40 A predecisional brief underscored the impression that the Navy’s
mine warfare community is taking this threat seriously. Indeed, for the last sev-
eral years—via conferences, full-scale exercises, and national-level command-
post exercises—the mine force has been working to define operational response
requirements sufficiently to allow concepts of operations and port-specific re-
sponse plans to be developed and put in place. Meanwhile, “joint” Navy and
Coast Guard planning continues within the MOTR framework.
It continues in other venues as well. For one, “Charleston has created Project
Seahawk to address and implement port-security capabilities against terrorism,”
Rear Admiral Charles “Chuck” Horne, USN (Retired), has noted.41 Horne, who
served as Commander, Mine Warfare Command in Charleston and still resides
there, is helping the SEAHAWK Team to include the terrorist mine threat. “Proj-
ect SEAHAWK will be looking at ways to prevent as well as respond to a mine
threat by addressing it well ahead of time.”
“The harbor and port MCM problem will not ultimately be resolved using tra-
ditional AMCM, SMCM, UMCM assets,” Rear Admiral Deborah A. Loewer, USN
(Retired), cautions, “as these tactics won’t work in the confined waters of ports,
harbors, and approaches.”42 Loewer, who was the last commander of Mine War-
fare Command before its stand-down on 1 October 2006, explained, “This prob-
lem will be solved using a combination of small vessels and helos, towed sensors,
UUVs, EOD, change detection and a variation of the tools currently under devel-
opment for the MCM mission package for the Littoral Combat Ship.”
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“Admiral Loewer’s comments are right on the mark,” Rear Admiral Richard
D. Williams III, USN (Retired), underscores.43 “The breadth and complexity
added to the mine problem in an in-port/near-port home-waters situation, as
compared to the blue-water or assault-breaching situation, are significant. Not
only are U.S. Navy ship and aircraft MCM assets of limited utility in in-port/
near-port roles, but operationally useful environmental, bottom, and port infra-
structure data and prearranged logistical and support procedures for each indi-
vidual port of major importance will be critical to a timely, successful, and safe
response to an in-port mine/UWIED scenario.” Admiral Williams notes further,
“The most important issue [for] current efforts—as well as supporting efforts at all
levels and across all boundaries that need to proceed with appropriate priority—
is to define action responsibilities so that requirements can be clearly deter-
mined and articulated and budgets aligned to ensure that the right tools and
operational support are acquired and put in place before they are needed.”
In short, once formal requirements for domestic MCM operations are estab-
lished, operational concepts and concepts of operations agreed upon, risk as-
sessments conducted, and priorities among and timelines for the various ports
articulated, capabilities strengths and gaps identified, and time-phased force de-
ployment data laid out, government and industry programs can be put in place
to ensure that strategic, operational, and tactical objectives will be met.
“Such a capability would have a deterrent effect,” Vice Admiral Hull has under-
scored, “and could make our adversaries think twice before attempting to mine
U.S. waters. Why make the attempt if it will be for naught?”
A TERRIBLE THING THAT WAITS . . .
The “anonymous, loosely affiliated perpetrators” who would strike America’s
ports and waterways have no qualms about “unchivalrous” attacks against any
target that would serve their causes. As Rear Admiral Farragut understood, “it
does not do to give your enemy such a decided superiority over you.”44
In 1950, after three thousand mines stymied plans for an amphibious assault
on Wonsan, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest Sherman, declared,
“We’ve been plenty submarine-conscious and air-conscious. Now we’re going to
start getting mine-conscious—beginning last week!”45 Four decades later the
CNO, Admiral Frank Kelso, underscored fundamental lessons relearned in the
northern Persian Gulf and called for renewed mine consciousness: “I believe
there are some fundamentals about mine warfare that we should not forget.
Once mines are laid, they are quite difficult to get rid of. That is not likely to
change. It is probably going to get worse, because mines are going to become
more sophisticated.”46 Writing on the eve of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Admi-
ral Robert J. Natter, Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Fleet Forces Command,
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warned: “Our first priority must be improving our near-term capabilities, but it
is also important to keep an eye on our long-term vision of mine warfare. . . .
Given the growing threat to our fleet and the current state of technology, we are
fools if we don’t.”47
Eight thousand foreign-flag ships enter American ports each year. Millions of
other vessels and pleasure boats ply America’s waterways. But only a few come
under close scrutiny by the Coast Guard or the Navy or state and local marine
police. This is troubling, as the Libyan ferry Ghat proved beyond reasonable
doubt that any ship can be a mine-layer once—if not many times. In short, as we
address America’s “threat-rich” maritime security problems we must become
mine and UWIED conscious, if not “last week” then certainly before a terrorist’s
weapon ruins our day.
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